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Predict Real Economic Activity? 
Benjamin M. Friedman and Kenneth N. Kuttner 
People have always sought reliable ways to predict the future, and economic 
fluctuations are no exception. Public policymakers, charged with the respon- 
sibility of maintaining full but not overfull employment of the economy’s pro- 
ductive resources, want to know when to take actions that will either stimulate 
or retard economic activity. Business executives who plan to build new facto- 
ries or modernize old ones, or who consider the introduction of new products, 
want to know when the markets for what their companies make will be strong. 
Both individual and institutional investors, allocating their portfolios across 
major asset categories like equities and fixed-income securities, and in some 
cases picking specific corporations’ stocks, want to know whether recession 
or economic expansion will prevail over the relevant investment horizon. 
A series of recent papers-Stock  and Watson (1989b), Friedman and Kutt- 
ner (1992), Bernanke (1990), and Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993)-has 
shown that, for the past three decades or so, the difference between the respec- 
tive interest rates on commercial paper and Treasury bills has borne a system- 
atic relation to subsequent fluctuations of  nonfinancial economic activity in 
the United States. As such relations go, this one has been fairly robust. The 
paper-bill spread easily outperforms any single interest rate, either nominal or 
real, as well as any of  the monetary aggregates, as a predictor of  real eco- 
nomic activity. The spread bears a statistically significant relation not just to 
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future movements of  aggregate output and spending but to almost all the fa- 
miliar components of real activity as well. Finally, in contrast to the monetary 
aggregates (the subject of  an earlier literature along these lines, which ended 
in disappointment), there is no ambiguity about whether the paper-bill spread 
is related to the real or the price side of nominal income fluctuations. (On the 
latest evidence, money is related to neither.) The spread is a predictor of real 
economic activity, not prices, and of  nominal magnitudes only to the extent 
that they reflect real ones. 
Why is all this so? And is there any ground for confidence that the relations 
that have connected the paper-bill spread to subsequent business fluctuations 
in the past will continue to prevail for at least some time into the future? These 
questions motivate the analysis presented in this paper. 
Section 5.1 briefly reviews and expands the evidence from previous work 
documenting the relations between the paper-bill  spread and real economic 
activity in the United States. Section 5.2 details some of the practical differ- 
ences between commercial paper and Treasury bills that plausibly account for 
the spread between the respective interest rates on these two instruments. An 
important product of  this part of  the analysis is a decomposition of the ob- 
served spread into a component that covaries directly with the general level of 
interest rates, a component directly representing the variation over time in the 
perceived risk of  default on commercial paper, and a component capturing 
other influences that vary over time in a way that may or may not be related to 
the business cycle. Section 5.3 uses a simple model of the behavior of borrow- 
ers and lenders in the short-term credit markets to develop three distinct (albeit 
not mutually exclusive) hypotheses to  account for the relation between the 
paper-bill spread and fluctuations in business activity. Section 5.4 applies a 
variety of statistical tests to provide evidence bearing on the validity of any or 
all of these three hypotheses. Section 5.5 brings together the principal conclu- 
sions developed throughout the paper. 
To  anticipate, the evidence presented in this paper suggests, at the least, a 
twofold explanation for the predictive power of the paper-bill spread with re- 
spect to real economic activity, an explanation based on both default risk and 
monetary policy. First, changing perceptions of default risk, as business pros- 
pects alternately strengthen and ebb, exert a clearly recognizable influence on 
the spread and also account for part of  the spread’s relation to subsequent 
movements of real output. Second, in a world in which investors view com- 
mercial paper as an imperfect substitute for Treasury bills-a  key assumption, 
for which the relations estimated in section 5.4 provide some supporting evi- 
dence-a  widening paper-bill spread is also a symptom of the contraction in 
bank lending due to tighter monetary policy. Finally, independent changes in 
the behavior of borrowers in the commercial paper market, due to their chang- 
ing cash requirements over the course of the business cycle, also influence the 
paper-bill spread in ways that connect it to subsequent economic fluctuations. 215  Why Does the Paper-Bill Spread Predict Real Economic Activity? 
5.1  The Basic Relation 
The upper panel of figure 5.1 shows monthly average values of the respec- 
tive interest rates on six-month prime-rated commercial paper and  180-day 
U.S. Treasury bills, for 1959-90.’ Both series display the basic features char- 
acteristic of  practically all U.S. interest rates during this period: a generally 
rising overall trend from the 1950s until the early 1980s, increasing volatility 
beginning in the early 1970s, a downward trend and reduced volatility in the 
mid- to late 1980s, and the familiar cyclicality throughout. (The shaded areas 
in the  figure represent recessions as designated by  the National Bureau of 
Economic Research.)  The commercial paper rate  has,  almost always, ex- 
ceeded the Treasury bill rate.* While the covariation of the two series is hardly 
perfect, the dominant visual impression offered by these data is that the two 
interest rates tend to move roughly together over time. 
The covariation of the two rates is not perfect, however, and the focus of 
this paper is on the movement over time of the difference between them. The 
lower panel of figure 5.1 (with magnified scale compared to that of the upper 
panel) plots the monthly average difference between the six-month commer- 
cial paper rate and the 180-day Treasury bill rate for the same period. Over 
the entire thirty-two-year sample, the mean spread was 0.57 percent per an- 
num (i.e., fifty-seven basis points), with a standard deviation of 0.49 percent. 
In contrast to the upper panel, here there is little evidence of  persistent time 
trends. But like the two interest rates themselves, the spread between them 
does display a distinct cyclicality. As table 5.1 shows, the spread is typically 
wider not just during but also immediately prior to recessions (although the 
1990 experience-in  which the spread widened much longer in  advance of 
the recession, only then to narrow again before the recession began-is  an 
obvious counterexample). 
Table 5.2, updated from Friedman and Kuttner (1992), shows that the wid- 
ening of the paper-bill spread in anticipation of  downturns in real economic 
activity represents information beyond that already contained in the serial cor- 
relation of real activity itself or in fluctuations of either price inflation or fed- 
eral government expenditures. The table also shows that other familiar finan- 
cial variables, like interest rates or growth of the monetary aggregates, either 
do not contain such incremental information at all or do so to a lesser extent. 
1.  Here, as well as elsewhere throughout this paper, the interest rates shown are discounts 
calculated on a 360-day basis. Data are from the Federal Reserve Board’s H. 15 release. 
2.  The only exceptions in this 384-month series are 19757-9,  1976:3, 19765, and 1977:l-3. 
Prior to November 1979, the “six-month commercial paper rate recorded by the Federal Reserve 
Board actually corresponded to paper with maturities of  120-79  days. The few anomalous nega- 
tive values of the paper-bill spread may therefore reflect a steep, upward-sloping term structure 
for commercial paper in specific months during that period (see Federal  Reserve Bulletin 65 [De- 
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Fig. 5.1 
paper-bill spread, 1959-1990 
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Table 5.1  Cyclical Behavior of the Paper-Bill Spread 
Spread (5%)  Observations 
Mean over entire 1959:  1-1990:  12 sample 
Mean during recessions 
Mean excluding recessions 
Mean  1-6  months prior to recessions 
Mean 7-12  months prior to recessions 
.57  384 
1.10  66 
.46  318 
.88  36 
.50  36 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
Nore: Observations are monthly averages of  daily data. Underlying interest rates are for 6-month 
commercial paper and 6-month Treasury bills. 
Table 5.2  F-Statistics for Financial Variables in Quarterly Real 
Output Equations 
Three-Variable System (real output, price index, financial 
variable) 
‘P  - rn  7,70***  8.12***  5.32*** 
Aln(M  I)  2.65**  2.59**  I .77 
Aln(M2)  4.66***  3.78***  2.19* 
ArP  5.80***  1.95  4.14*** 
ArH  4.76***  2.21*  3.62*** 
r10 -  ‘Ff  7.34***  4.44*  * *  6.70*** 
Aln(credit)  1.21  1.97  .34 
Four-Variable System (also including mid-expansion gov- 
ernment expenditures) 
‘P  -  ‘H  7.16***  7.10***  4.68*** 
Aln(MI)  2.85**  2.71**  1.81 
Aln(M2)  4.32***  3.63***  1.81 
Aln(credit)  1.02  2.34*  .I6 
ArP  5.61***  1.55  3.94*** 
Ar,  4.52***  1.81  3.44** 
r,n -  rrF  7.23***  3.82***  6.41*** 
Nore:  Regressions include four lags of  each  included variable. Real  output variable  is  gross 
national product  in  1982 dollars.  Price  index is the  implicit GNP deflator.  rp is  the  rate on 
6-month prime commercial paper. rn is the rate on 6-month Treasury bills. Credit is total domestic 
nonfinancial debt. r,”  is the  10-year Treasury-bond yield. rFf  is the Federal funds rate. 
*  Significant at the 10% level. 
**  Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the  I% level 218  Benjamin M. Friedman and Kenneth N. Kuttner 
The upper panel of the table presents F-statistics for the null hypothesis that 
all coefficients Zi are zero in regressions of the form 
*  *  A 
,=I  I= I  ,=I 
where X  and P  are the natural logarithms of  real gross national product and 
the corresponding price deflator, respectively; 2 is, first, the difference be- 
tween the six-month prime commercial paper rate and the 180-day Treasury 
bill rate and then, in sequence, a series of other familiar financial variables as 
indicated in the table; u is a disturbance term; and a,  Pi,  yi, and St are all 
coefficients to be estimated. The lower panel presents analogous F-statistics 
based on equations that are identical to (1) except that they also include, as an 
additional set of  regressors, a distributed lag on the (log) change in “mid- 
expansion” federal expenditures. The table presents results separately for the 
full 1960:11-199O:IV  sample and for two subsamples: 196O:II-1979:111  (i.e., 
until the Federal Reserve System’s adoption of  new monetary policy proce- 
dures in October 1979) and 1970:III-l99O:IV  (i.e., since the elimination of 
Regulation Q interest ceilings on large certificates of deposit in June 1970).’ 
Among the seven financial variables considered, the paper-bill spread is one 
of only two-the  other being the long-short spread-that  contain incremental 
information about subsequent movements of  real output that is significant at 
the .01 level in the full 1960-90  sample and in both subsamples separately, 
regardless of whether the fiscal variable is included. Indeed, none of  the other 
five financial variables considered meets this criterion even at the .  10 signifi- 
cance level. 
Table 5.3 presents an analogous set of results based on monthly data. Here 
industrial production takes the place of  real gross national product, the pro- 
ducer price index takes the place of the GNP deflator, each distributed lag is 
of length 6, and the results shown correspond only to the upper panel of table 
5.2-that  is, without the fiscal ~ariable.~  Here the paper-bill spread is alone 
among the seven variables tested in containing incremental information about 
subsequent movements of  industrial production that is significant at the .01 
level in the full 1960-90 sample as well as in both subsamples separately. The 
growth rate of the M2 money stock, the change in the commercial paper rate, 
and the long-short spread satisfy this criterion at the .05 level. None  of  the 
other financial variables does so even at the .  10 level. 
Table 5.4 presents results for an alternative form of test, suggested by Stock 
and Watson (1989a), again based on monthly data. The Stock-Watson regres- 
sion includes twelve lags each of the respective log changes in industrial pro- 
3.  Data for gross national product, the deflator, mid-expansion federal spending, and the mon- 
4.  There is no readily available monthly series corresponding to mid-expansion federal govern- 
etary aggregates are seasonally adjusted. Data for interest rates and the paper-bill spread are not. 
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Table 5.3  F-Statistics for Financial Variables in Monthly Real 
Output Equations 
1960:2-1990: 12  1960:2-1979:9  I970:7-1990: I2 
Three-Variable System (real output, price index, financial variable) 
‘P  -  rn  8.47*** 
Aln(M1)  2.27** 
AIn(M2)  4.70*** 
Aln(credit)  I .45 
ArP  2.89*** 
Ar,  2.03* 
rlil -  rFF  3.99*** 
6.33*** 
2.23** 












Note; Regressions include six lags of each included variable. Real output variable is industrial 
production.  Price index is the producer price index.  For definitions of  the other variables, see 
table 5.2 
*  Significant at the 10% level. 
**  Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the  I% level. 
Table 5.4  F-Statistics for Financial Variables in Monthly Real Output 
Equations (Stock-  Watson specification) 
1960:2-1990: I2  I960:2-1Y7Y :9  1970:7-1990: 12 
Four-Variable System (real output, price index, commercial paper rate, 
financial variable) 
r,  ~  r,  6.04*** 
Aln(M1)  .83 
Aln(M2)  3.08*** 
Aln(credit)  1.10 
rio -  ~FF  2.11* 
2.85***  4.24*** 
.77  .59 
2.25**  1.47 
.93  1.29 
1.16  1.62 
Note: Regressions include six lags of the financial variable, twelve lags of  each of  the other three 
variables, and a linear time trend. Variables are defined as in tables 5.2 and 5.3 
*  Significant at the 10% level. 
**  Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the  I% level. 
duction and the producer price index, twelve lags of  the change in the com- 
mercial  paper  rate  (so  that  the  list  of  variables  corresponding  to Z  now 
excludes the paper rate change and the bill rate change), six lags on the des- 
ignated financial variable, and a linear time trend. Here the paper-bill spread 
is again the only financial variable tested that contains incremental informa- 
tion about subsequent movements in industrial production that is significant at 
the  .01 level regardless of  sample. None of the others-including  the long- 
short spread-does  so even at the .  10 level. 220  Benjamin M. Friedman and Kenneth N. Kuttner 
Finally, table 5.5 presents both F-statistics and variance decompositions 
based on a series of vector autoregression systems including, in each case, the 
respective log changes in real output and the corresponding price deflator, the 
paper-bill spread, and, one at a time in succession, each of the other financial 
variables considered in tables 5.2 and 5.3 above. The estimation is based on 
quarterly data,  with variables and lag  specification corresponding to those 
underlying the upper panel of table 5.2. For each system, the table presents 
the F-statistics for the distributed lags on the paper-bill spread and the other 
financial variable in the equation for real output, then the respective share of 
the variance of real output accounted for by the paper-bill spread and by  the 
other financial variable (together with  the corresponding 95 percent confi- 
dence intervals), measured at both four- and eight-quarter horizons. For pur- 
poses of  these variance decompositions, the real output variable is ordered 
first, the price variable second, the other financial variable third, and the pa- 
per-bill spread last. 
When the measure of  output used is real gross national product (the upper 
panel), the F-statistics presented in table 5.5 indicate that the paper-bill spread 
contains incremental information about subsequent movements in real output 
that  is  significant at the  .01 level  in  the presence of  any of  the additional 
financial variables except M2 and the long-short spread, in which case the 
relevant information is significant at the .05 level and the .10 level, respec- 
tively. Among the other financial variables considered, only the long-short 
spread and the bill rate change are significant here at the .  10 level or better in 
the presence of the paper-bill spread. 
When the output measure is real domestic absorption (the middle panel), 
however, the paper-bill spread contains information that is significant at the 
.01 level in the presence of  any of the other financial variables. Among the 
others, here only the paper rate change and the bill rate change (separately) 
contain significant incremental information in the presence of  the paper-bill 
spread. Similarly, when the output measure is real investment in plant and 
equipment (the lower panel), the paper-bill spread again contains information 
that is significant at the .01 level in the presence of any of the other financial 
variables. Here the bill rate change is the only other variable to contain signif- 
icant incremental information in the presence of the paper-bill spread. 
The variance decomposition results presented in table 5.5 largely support 
these findings from significance tests based on the output equation alone. In 
most of the vector autoregression systems estimated, the paper-bill spread ac- 
counts for a percentage of  the variance of  the relevant real output measure, 
either four or eight quarters ahead, that is both economically important (typi- 
cally between 10 and 20 percent) and statistically significant (at the .05 level). 
Further, in most cases the paper-bill spread dominates whatever is the other 
financial variable in the system despite the ordering of  the paper-bill spread 
5. In related work, Wizman (1990) has shown that results like those presented in table 5.5 
carry over to systems simultaneously  containing many more variables. 221  Why Does the Paper-Bill Spread Predict Real Economic Activity? 
Table 5.5  Performance of Alternative Financial Indicators in Quarterly Real 
Output VARs 
Output  = Real Gross National Product 
Aln(M1)  rp -  r,  Aln(M2)  r, -  r,  Aln(credit)  rp - rw 
F-statistic 




% of variance: 
@ 44 
@ 8Q 
1.59  6.29***  .76  3.33**  .92  7.11*** 
929  18212  12-ClO  949 
11 2 9  18 2  12  15 t  11  10 2 8 
ArW  r,  - rw  Ar,  rP  -  ‘8 
2.19*  4.81***  1.89  3.51*** 
12 4  10  14 2  10  16 -t  11  9 t  8 
16 2  11  14 4 10  18 2 12  10 -1-  8 
Output = Real Domestic Absorption 
425  22412 
525  22k12 
2.09*  2.39* 
15411  727 
17 2  11  13 + 11 
Aln(M1)  r, - r,  Aln(M2)  rp -  r,  Aln(credit)  r,  -  r, 
F-statistic 




% of variance: 
@ 44 
@ 8Q 
1.44  8.57***  1.81  5.26***  1.34  10.30*** 
10 -t  10  19 2  12  15  -+  11  10 + 9  3+5  27514 
12 2 10  20 4  12  17  2 12  13 t  9  425  27214 
ArB  r,  -  r,  Ar,  r~ -  ‘B  “10  -  ~FF  r~ -  r~ 
3.45*  6.79***  2.88**  4.06***  1.48  3.96*** 
16211  15+11  22212  828  18-cl2  828 
22 f  13  17 2  11  23 + 12  14 ? 10  19 ? 12  18 ? 12 
Output  = Real Business Fixed Investment 
Aln(M1)  rp -  re  Aln(M2)  r,  -  r,  Aln(credit)  r, -  r, 
F-statistic 




% of variance: 
@ 44 
@ 8Q 
.32  4.07***  .68  2.14*  .I7  4.66*** 
7C9  17212  14212  9210  224  21214 
829  20214  17414  10t10  3k4  24216 
Ar,  r,  -  r,  Arp  ‘P  -  ‘8  r10  -  ‘FF  ‘P  -  ‘B 
2.26*  4.71***  1.60  4.32***  .89  3.54*** 
425  20214  8+9  17-1-13  648  13-1-12 
12 2  11  19 2 14  15  2  14  16 + 12  14 2 12  14 2  11 
Nore: Sample in each case is 19602-1990:4.  Equations include four lags of  each variable. The 
mean variance decomposition and its confidence interval were computed via Monte-Carlo simu- 
lations with  I ,OOO  draws. Variables are defined as in table 5.2. The ordering for the decomposi- 
tions is as follows: output, prices, financial variable, paper-bill spread. 
*  Significant at the 10% level. 
**  Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the  1%  level. 222  Benjamin M. Friedman and Kenneth N. Kuttner 
last in the underlying orthogonalization.  Table 5.6 highlights the relevance of 
this  ordering  by  presenting  alternative  variance  decomposition  results  for 
those three financial variables that, for at least some output measures, account 
for a greater share of output in the decompositions shown in table 5.5. In these 
alternative results, in which the paper-bill spread is ordered third and the other 
financial variable fourth, the dominance of the paper-bill spread is pervasive. 
In sum, both single-equation significance tests and multiple-equation vari- 
ance decompositions based on the last three decades of U.S. experience con- 
sistently point to a statistically significant relation between movements of the 
paper-bill  spread and subsequent fluctuations  in real economic activity, even 
in the presence of other financial variables that previous researchers have often 
advanced as potential business-cycle predictors. 
5.2  Accounting for the Spread 
Commercial paper represents the unsecured,  discounted short-term (up to 
270 days)  liability  of  either nonfinancial  business corporations or financial 
intermediaries.  As of  year-end  1990, the volume of such claims outstanding 
in the United States totaled $610 billion, of  which approximately  19 percent 
was the liability of U.S. nonfinancial businesses, 5 percent of U.S. bank hold- 
ing companies, 55 percent of  U.S. nonbank  financial intermediaries,  and  12 
percent  of foreign obligors.  Roughly one-third of  the $610 billion had been 
originally issued directly by the obligors (in practically all cases financial in- 
stitutions)  and  the  remaining  two-thirds  through  commercial  paper  dealers 
acting in the obligors’ behalf. Although commercial paper in some form or 
other has existed in the United States for over a century, the commercial paper 
market in its current form is largely  a post-World  War  I1 phenomenon,  and 
the market’s growth in recent decades has been rapid. As recently as 1960, for 
example, the total volume outstanding was just $6.5 billion (13 percent issued 
by U.S. nonfinancial  businesses, 57 percent by U.S. nonbank financial inter- 
mediaries, and 18 percent by foreign obligors).6 
Treasury bills represent the short-term (up to one year) discount obligations 
of  the U.S. Treasury, backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. govern- 
ment.  The Treasury  first  issued  discounted  instruments  resembling  today’s 
Treasury bills in 1929. Since then, the volume outstanding has fluctuated with 
the level of the government’s debt and also with the varying maturity patterns 
used to finance that debt. Given the enormous volume of debt of all maturities 
used  to finance the  U.S.  military  effort  in World War  11,  the  Treasury  bill 
market has been large and well developed throughout the postwar period. The 
volume of Treasury  bills outstanding  in  1946 was $17 billion.  At year-end 
1990, it was $482 billion. 
Three factors appear most important in accounting for the typically greater 
6. Data are from the Federal Reserve System’s flow-of-funds accounts. Useful descriptive ac- 
counts of the development and functioning of the commercial paper market include Selden (1963), 
Baxter (1966). Hurley (1977, 1982), and Stigum (1990). 223  Why Does the Paper-Bill Spread Predict Real Economic Activity? 
Table 5.6  Performance of Alternative Financial Indicators in Quarterly Real 
Output VARs, Orthogonalization  Order Reversed 
r, -  rs  Aln(M2)  r, -  rs  r,o -  rFF  r, -  rs  *rP 
Output = Real Gross National Product 
F-statistic  3.33***  .76  2.39*  2.09*  3.51***  1.89 
% of variance: 
(3 44  17212  4t5  16511  6t7  18t12  727 
(3 8Q  16 2  11  8 2 8  15  2  10  15  2  11  17  t  11  12  ~fr  9 
Output = Real Domestic Absorption 
F-statistic  5.26***  1.81  3.96***  1.48  4.06***  2.88** 
% of variance: 
@ 44  21t13  526  21213  427  21t12  1028 
(3 8Q  20 t  12  11 t  10  21 2  12  17 t  13  21 t  11  17 2  11 
Output  = Real Business Fixed Investment 
F-statistic  2.14*  .68  3.54***  .89  4.32***  1.60 
% of  variance: 
@ 4Q  18t14  5t7  17214  3t4  21214  3t4 
@ 84  19214  829  16213  12+12  23t14  757 
Nore: The ordering for the decompositions is as follows: output, prices, paper-bill spread, finan- 
cial variable. See also note to table 5.5. 
observed interest rate on commercial paper than on Treasury bills. First, fed- 
eral statute precludes states or municipalities from taxing income earned as 
interest on any U.S. Treasury obligations, bills included, except for those 
states that employ the franchise tax on business income or impose an excise 
tax on bank income. By contrast, interest earned on privately issued obliga- 
tions,  like commercial paper,  is typically taxable at  the state or municipal 
level. As of  1990, forty-three states (plus the District of Columbia) had indi- 
vidual income taxes, with rates applicable to interest income varying up to a 
high of  14 percent in Connecticut. Similarly, twenty-eight states (plus the Dis- 
trict of Columbia) had corporate income taxes.’ In addition, some municipal- 
ities have income taxes applicable to interest income. In 1990, New York City 
taxed income earned by residents at a maximum rate of 3.95 percent.* 
To  the extent that an investor choosing between commercial paper and Trea- 
sury bills is a taxable entity domiciled in a state and/or municipality with an 
income tax, therefore, some positive interest rate spread between paper and 
bills is necessary to render the two instruments’ respective returns identical 
on an after-tax basis-that  is, to achieve 
7.  In addition, seventeen states had a franchise tax on business income, and eighteen states 
8. Cook and Lawler (1983) provided a highly useful discussion of the role of taxes in account- 
levied an excise tax on bank income (see State Tax Handbook 1990). 
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where rp and ra are the nominal interest rates paid on commercial paper and 
Treasury bills,  respectively, and  T  is the effective state/municipal tax  rate. 
Moreover, the spread required for this purpose varies directly with the level of 
the tax-exempt rate, according to 
(3) 
Given values of 0.57 percent for the spread and 6.48 percent for the bill rate, 
on average for the 1959-90  sample period spanned in  figure 5.1 above, the 
implied effective tax rate would be 8.1 percent (i.e., 0.081) if differential tax- 
ability were the sole factor accounting for a nonzero average spread over time. 
(A 9.7  percent tax rate would be required to explain in full the average spread 
between commercial paper and Treasury bills at three months’ maturity.) 
A second factor clearly differentiating Treasury bills from commercial pa- 
per is that payment on the paper is subject to potential default by private obli- 
gors. Moreover, in the event of bankruptcy, the unsecured status of  commer- 
cial  paper  typically  places  it  low  on  the  scale  in  the  application  of  the 
conventional “me-first’’ rules. Given any nonzero probability of default, even 
a risk-neutral investor would require a positive paper-bill spread to want to 
hold commercial paper instead of  Treasury bills. The expected after-tax re- 
turns on the two assets are identical when 
(4)  (1 - n+)(l -  T)rp -  IT+  = r,, 
where rp  is now the promised interest rate on the commercial paper, IT  is the 
probability that a default on the paper will occur within the time horizon that 
is relevant for this investment, + is the fraction (0 I  + 5  1) of  the stated 
principal amount that the investor will lose in the event of  default, and T  is 
again the state/municipal tax rate. 
If  investors are risk averse, however, mere equality of  expected returns is 
insufficient to make an investor willing to hold a risky rather than a risk-free 
asset, so the required spread is correspondingly greater. To take a simple ex- 
ample, suppose that an investor’s portfolio consists entirely of Treasury bills 
and commercial paper and that the investor’s choice between them is governed 
by maximization of expected utility of nominal end-of-period wealth, where 
the “period” is identical to the stated maturity of the bills and the paper (so 
that the bills are genuinely riskless) and utility is characterized by  constant 
relative risk aversion. Then the relation between the two (promised) interest 
rates that leaves the investor just indifferent between the two assets at the 
margin is 
(5)  [l - IT+  - 2ap~r(1  -   IT)+^] (1 -  T)rp 
- ap~r(1  - n)+2  (1 -  T)~  r; - n+[l + ap(1 -  IT)+]  = r,, 225  Why Does the Paper-Bill Spread Predict Real Economic Activity? 
where a  is the fraction of the investor’s portfolio invested in commercial pa- 
per, and p is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
In contrast to the experience of  the interwar period, which included  171 
separate default episodes,  few  issuers have  defaulted on  their outstanding 
commercial paper since World  War  II.9 By  far the most significant postwar 
default was Penn Central’s failure to meet payment on $82 million of paper 
due in June 1970. Following the Penn Central default, the major credit rating 
agencies introduced new systems of rating commercial paper, not only distin- 
guishing prime-rated from non-prime-rated paper, but also designating three 
separate categories of  prime-rated paper (Pl, P2, and P3 by  Moody’s; Al, 
A2, and A3 by Standard and Poor’s). Since the introduction of these ratings, 
only six rated issuers had experienced defaults by  the end of  1991, and four 
of these had lost their prime ratings before their respective defaults occurred.  lo 
Some authors have pointed  to the scant experience of  actual defaults to 
argue that default risk must play a small if not negligible role in accounting 
for the observed positive spread between the promised interest rate on com- 
mercial paper and the Treasury bill rate (see, e.g., Bernanke 1990). To  be 
sure, this argument is plausible if the question at hand is whether default risk 
alone can explain the spread. As with the two instruments’ differing tax sta- 
tus, however, the relevant issue is the potential role played by default risk in 
conjunction with other factors. 
Gauging the relevant default rate IT  and loss rate $I  to employ in an expres- 
sion like (5) is problematic for several reasons. One is just  the distinction 
between event frequencies observed within any (finite) sample and the corre- 
sponding subjective probabilities as  assessed by  rational agents-in  other 
words, the familiar “peso problem” (see, e.g., Krasker 1980). A second is 
that there is no guarantee that the relevant agents whose subjective probabili- 
ties have mattered for the relative pricing of commercial paper and Treasury 
bills were in fact “rational” in the usual technical sense. Yet  a third is that 
many of  these agents-those  acting in a fiduciary capacity, for example- 
may have been responding to incentives not encompassed within the usual 
risk-return utility calculus. (The manager’s embarrassment in the event of  a 
client’s holding defaulted paper may matter, in addition to the pecuniary loss 
to the account.) Finally, many investors in commercial paper either cannot or 
do not diversify their holdings sufficiently to render their own potential loss 
rates equivalent to those of the commercial paper universe outstanding. Such 
investors therefore plausibly perceive a  potential  default  as  a  more  cata- 
strophic event than the aggregate data would suggest. 
Figure 5.2 plots combinations of default probability IT  (for values up to a 
maximum of  .l)  and  state tax rate  T (for values up  to  .09) that satisfy the 
9. For an  account of the interwar exuerience. see Selden (1963).  ~, 
10. For a detailed history of experieke under the rating system, see Moody’s Investors Service 
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relation in  (5) for the average values of  r, and rB  observed over  1959-90, 
given the default-state loss rate 4 = .0064,  portfolio proportion a = .37 (the 
most recent actual paper/[paper + bill] ratio as measured in the Federal Re- 
serve's flow-of-funds accounts), and two separate values of the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion p: zero (i.e., risk neutrality) and twenty. A loss rate of 
.0064 corresponds to the worst-recorded experience for the commercial paper 
market in any given year since World War  I, when 0.64 percent of  the out- 
standing paper was lost in defaults in 193  1. Parameter n  therefore represents 
the probability that investors associate with a given year's replicating the 193  1 
default experience. 
As the discussion of equations (2) and (3) above indicates, a state tax rate 
of  .081 would be sufficient to account fully for the observed mean paper-bill 
spread in the absence of any possibility at all of  default. A nonzero probability 
of  default makes the observed mean spread consistent with a lower tax rate. 
For example, if investors believe that there is a one-in-twenty chance of de- 
fault on 0.64 percent of their commercial paper holdings (i.e., n = .05),  this 
default probability, together with a state tax rate of approximately .06, would 
be  sufficient to account for the entire observed mean spread. As the figure 
makes clear, these results are not very sensitive to the assumed risk aversion. 
Finally, a third factor potentially also underlying the positive average paper- 
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paper.”  The market for U.S. Treasury bills has traditionally been the most 
liquid of any asset market in the United States (in recent decades, in the entire 
world) in terms of an investor’s ability to buy or sell large amounts of  securi- 
ties with minimum transactions costs, minimum effect of the investor’s own 
action on the market price, maximum availability of  agents willing to act in 
the investor’s behalf, and maximum availability of  either financing for mar- 
gined long positions or securities to borrow against short positions. Despite 
substantial advances in the last decade or two, the commercial paper market 
has never met this standard. Firms issuing commercial paper or dealers acting 
in  their behalf are usually willing to take back paper presented by  investors 
before the stated maturity date, but they bear no legal obligation to do so. 
Finding third-party buyers is also problematic. 
Various legal restrictions also contribute to making Treasury bills a more 
liquid asset than commercial paper for the specific categories of  investors to 
which  they apply. Commercial banks and other depository institutions, for 
example, can use Treasury bills as collateral when they borrow from the Fed- 
eral Reserve discount window. Commercial paper is not eligible collateral for 
this purpose. Similarly, under current federal tax law, state governments un- 
dertaking advance refunding of outstanding obligations must invest the pro- 
ceeds in Treasury securities to avoid sacrificing the exemption of the interest 
that they pay from taxability at the federal level. Here too, commercial paper 
does not qualify. 
Differential liquidity therefore presumably accounts for at least some part 
of  the positive paper-bill spread on average over time. In  analytic terms, a 
liquidity value of  bills over paper might simply take the form of  a constant 
subtracted from the left-hand side of (3,  which in turn would shift both curves 
in figure 5.2. But differential liquidity could also account for either cyclical 
variation of the paper-bill spread (e.g., if investors value liquidity more highly 
when a recession increases the uncertainty surrounding their own cash flows) 
or a time trend in the spread (presumably negative, to reflect the gradually 
increasing efficiency of the commercial paper market during the past few dec- 
ades). 
In the end, what is most interesting about the paper-bill spread is neither 
the mean spread over time nor the presence or absence of a time trend but the 
way  in which variation of  the spread through time corresponds, with some 
lead period, to fluctuations in real economic activity. There is little reason to 
think that state or municipal income tax rates vary  systematically with the 
business cycle. By contrast, there is some ground for suspecting that the value 
that investors place on the greater liquidity of bills over paper does so. Fur- 
ther, as figure 5.3 shows, both the frequency of business failures and the vol- 
11. The classic discussion of  liquidity in this context is that of  Kessel (1965). An aspect of 
Kessel’s treatment that is especially relevant to some of the results presented below is his argument 
that the premium placed on liquidity would (like the tax effect and the default risk effect discussed 
above) vary directly with the level of interest rates. 228  Benjamin M. Friedman and Kenneth N. Kuttner 
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Fig. 5.3  Bankruptcy and default rates, 1953-90 
Source: Dun and Bradstreet. 
Note: Coverage does not include all industry sectors. 
ume of defaulted business liabilities (scaled by gross national product) vary 
inversely with the pace of real economic activity.'* As a result, it is also plau- 
sible to suppose that rational investors increase their subjective assessment of 
default rate 7~  (and perhaps also their assessment of loss rate +) if they have 
independent information indicating that a business recession is imminent. If 
they do, then arbitrage behavior like that underlying the relation in (5) would, 
in turn, deliver time variation in the paper-bill  spread that would anticipate 
business fluctuations. 
In addition, given that such features as the favorable tax treatment of bills, 
the default risk on paper, and the superior liquidity of  bills render these two 
instruments imperfect portfolio substitutes,  fluctuations in their relative mar- 
ket supplies will also lead to fluctuations in the spread along the lines illus- 
trated in (5). As the discussion in section 5.3 below explains, some of these 
supply movements, and hence some of the resulting fluctuations in the spread, 
are plausibly related to the business cycle. Others, however, may merely re- 
flect institutional technicalities  of the Treasury bill market. Short-term fluc- 
tuations in the Treasury's cash flow alternatively swell the supply of bills or 
12. For discussions of the increase in the failure rate and the default rate as a result of increased 
financial fragility in the 1980s. see Friedman (1986, 1990). 229  Why Does the Paper-Bill Spread Predict Real Economic Activity? 
increase the demand (by forcing banks to present eligible collateral against 
enlarged tax and loan account balances). These fluctuations occur in part on a 
seasonal basis but also in part irregularly. Fluctuations in the volume of  ad- 
vance debt refundings by  state and local governments, as sometimes occur in 
anticipation of changes in tax legislation, also affect the demand for Treasury 
bills (because of legal restrictions on these borrowers’ options for temporarily 
reinvesting the proceeds of  advance refundings). So do fluctuations in the 
Federal Reserve’s open market operations (because most open market pur- 
chases and sales take place in Treasury securities). So do most exchange mar- 
ket interventions by  foreign central banks (because most central banks,  al- 
though nowadays not all, hold a disproportionately large share of their dollar 
portfolios in Treasury bills compared to the portfolio of  the typical private 
market participant). So do the “window dressing” activities of banks and other 
private investors that choose to sacrifice a few days’ interest differential in 
order to show atypically large Treasury bill holdings on their year- or even 
quarter-end financial statements. The effect of each of these institutional dis- 
tortions is presumably to introduce “noise” in the paper-bill spread, in  the 
sense of movement unlikely to correspond to what matters in financial mar- 
kets for nonfinancial economic activity. 
Table 5.7 presents estimation results for a series of regressions intended to 
capture some of the main elements in the discussion above of the determinants 
of  the paper-bill spread. The coefficient values in the first row of the table, 
based on monthly  data spanning 1974:l-1990: 12, show that the paper-bill 
spread is positively (and strongly) related to the level of the bill rate, as the 
tax argument and the default-risk argument presented above both suggest.  I3 
The results in the second row  show that the spread is also positively (and 
strongly) related  to the perceived commercial paper default risk, measured 
here by the differential between the respective interest rates on P2- and Pl- 
rated paper. The results in the third row show that both findings hold up, to at 
least a marginally significant degree, when the regression includes the two 
variables together. Finally, the results in the fourth row show that, even in the 
presence of these two variables, there is again no statistically significant evi- 
dence of a time trend in the spread. (A negative time trend, e.g., might repre- 
sent a declining liquidity value of  bills over paper as the commercial paper 
market has developed over time.) 
The lower panel of table 5.7 shows the results of an attempt to replicate, for 
the longer sample spanning 1959:  1-1990: 12, the four regressions shown just 
above. Because published commercial paper ratings were not introduced until 
13.  Although augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for stationarity of the paper-bill spread reject the 
nonstationarity null at the .01 level, the fact that analogous tests for the interest rate level do not 
reject at the . 10 level warrants care in interpreting the standard errors on the interest rate in these 
regressions, which may have nonstandard asymptotic distributions. Indeed, the observation that 
the spread is I(0) while the interest rate is I( 1) is inconsistent with any hypothesis that the spread 
merely captures the effect of the interest rate level (via, e.g.,  differential taxation). 230  Benjamin M. Friedman and Kenneth N. Kuttner 
Table 5.7  Decompositions of the Paper-Bill Spread 
Interest  Quality 
Constant  Rate Level  Differential  Trend  B2  SE  D-W 
Using the Commercial Paper Quality Differential (sample 1974: 1-1990: 12) 
.09  .I6  .50  .30 
.70  .22  .48  .33 
.05  .54  .30  .47  .32 
.05  .68  -  .OO15  .28  .46  .33 
(.02) 
(.20) 
~03)  (27) 
(.W  (.0018) 
Using the Corporate Bond Quality Differential (sample 1959: 1-1990: 12) 
.07  .I6  .44  .31 
.13  .01  .48  .28 
.09  -  .20  .I8  .44  .33 
.I1  -.I5  -  .0008  .I9  .43  .34 
(.02) 
(.Ill 
(.03)  (. 13) 
~03)  (. 12)  (.0007) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors, corrected for  12th-order moving-aver- 
age serial correlation. 
after the Penn Central default, however-hence  the 1974 starting date of the 
sample used for the regressions in the upper panel-here  the spread between 
the respective interest rates on Baa- and Aaa-rated corporate bonds is used as 
a proxy for perceived commercial paper default risk. Risk of default over the 
coming six months need not be the same as risk of default over the life of  a 
twenty- or thirty-year bond, however, so the default-risk aspect of the attempt 
to extend these results backward to the longer sample does not deliver signifi- 
cant results.I4 (Indeed, in equations combining the bill rate level and the bond 
quality spread, the point estimates for the spread variable’s coefficient are, 
nonsensically, negative). By contrast, the strongly positive relation between 
the paper-bill spread and the level of the bill rate corresponds well to the result 
found in the shorter sample. So does the absence of  any evidence of  a time 
trend. 
14. An additional symptom of the weak link between the paper-bill spread and the Baa-Aaa 
bond spread is that, while the paper-bill spread is I(O),  the bond quality differential appears to be 
1(1) over the 1959-90  sample. (Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests are unable to reject the null hy- 
pothesis of nonstationarity of  the bond quality differential even at the .I0  level, while analogous 
tests for the paper-bill spread over the shorter 1974-90  sample do reject the null at the .05 level.) 
In other words, the bond quality differential appears to contain an integrated component that is not 
shared by the paper-bill spread. 231  Why Does the Paper-Bill Spread Predict Real Economic Activity? 
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Fig. 5.4 
paper-bill spread, 1974-90 
Interest rate level, default risk, and residual components of the 
Figure 5.4, based on the regression in the third row of the upper panel of 
table 5.7, shows a decomposition of  the monthly variation of  the paper-bill 
spread during 1974-90  into three components: a part attributed to variation 
in the bill rate; a part attributed to perceived default risk, as measured by the 
P2-P1 differential; and the regression residual (augmented by  the constant 
term). Table 5.8 presents summary statistics for these three components, in- 
cluding their respective simple correlations with changes in  real output, as 232  Benjamin M. Friedman and Kenneth N. Kuttner 
Table 5.8  Analysis of  Components of the Paper-Bill Spread 
Correlation with: 
F- 
Mean  SD  Aln(IP,)  Aln(IP,+  ,)  Statistic 
Constant  -.I2  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Interest rate level  .45  .I4  -.I1  -  .21***  2.65** 
Quality differential  .28  .20  -.43***  -  .42***  4.00*** 
Residual  ...  .47  -  .13*  -  .24***  2.60** 
Note:  Results for the residual are based on the regression in the top panel of  table 5.7, row 3. 
The correlations  use  data from  1974:l-1990:12.  The F-statistics  are  from reduced-form real 
output regressions analogous to those in table 5.3, for the 1974:7-1990:12  sample. IP is the index 
of  industrial production. 
*  Significant at the  10% level. 
**  Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the  1% level. 
well as F-statistics for the significance of distributed lags on these components 
in equations for real output analogous to (1) above. 
What stands out in these results is that each of  the three components of  the 
paper-bill spread-the  part attributed to variation in the bill rate, the part at- 
tributed to perceived default risk, and the unattributed residual component- 
contain  statistically  significant  incremental  information  about  subsequent 
fluctuations in real output. The simple correlation of each component with the 
change in real  output one month  ahead  is significant at the .01 level.  The 
distributed lag on each component in equations for real output analogous to 
those reported in table 5.3 above is significant at the .05 level or better. 
Hence factors like state and municipal  taxation,  which plausibly account 
for a major part of the average spread over time but do not themselves plausi- 
bly fluctuate in a systematic way over the business cycle, may still play a role 
in the spread’s predictive content by virtue of the way in which their effect on 
the spread interacts with the level of the bill rate. Perceived default risk (as 
measured by the P2-P1 differential) more plausibly fluctuates with prospects 
for business activity, and it is also apparently part of  the story.I5 Finally, the 
significance of the residual component may represent a role for either varia- 
tion in the liquidity value of bills over paper or variation in perceived default 
risk not captured by the P2-P1 differential, or both. 
5.3  Borrowers and Lenders in the Short-Term Credit Markets 
The analysis presented in section 5.2 suggests a role for both time-varying 
default risk and a time-varying liquidity premium as explanations of the pre- 
15.  As the analysis above indicates, default risk may also explain why the level of the bill rate 
would influence the spread. (The relation in [4], e.g.,  implies that the spread is proportional to the 
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dictive power of the paper-bill spread with respect to real output. Based as it 
is entirely on the observed spread and on inferred components of the spread, 
that analysis has little to say about how variations over time in either default 
risk or the liquidity value of bills over paper arise or why these variations are 
related to fluctuations in real output. Given the nature of recorded bankrupt- 
cies, it is straightforward to see why perceived default risk might covary with 
the business cycle. Why the liquidity value of bills over paper might do so 
bears  further investigation.  In  both cases,  however, developing hypotheses 
about financial behavior that facilitate bringing to bear data on debt quantities 
as well as interest rates is likely to be helpful as a way of distinguishing em- 
pirically  among competing explanations for the predictive properties of the 
spread. 
Three such hypotheses are especially interesting in this context. 
5.3.1  Changes in Perceptions of Default Risk 
First, a widening of the paper-bill spread in advance of business downturns 
may reflect anticipations, on the part of investors, that a downturn is likely to 
occur and hence that default by  private borrowers with cyclically sensitive 
cash flows has become more likely. To  the extent that these anticipations tend 
on average to be correct, fluctuations in the spread will predict fluctuations in 
the growth of real output. Further,  if  investors’ anticipations in this regard 
embody information from disparate sources or information that is otherwise 
difficult to quantify or to summarize in a compact way, the paper-bill spread 
will have predictive content that is significant even in the presence of other 
standard predictors of output fluctuations like those included in the regres- 
sions presented in section 5.1 above. 
Figure 5.5 shows schematically the implications, for the bank loan market 
(left) and the commercial paper market (right), of  an increase in the default 
risk that lenders in the short-term credit markets associate with private obli- 
gations, on the assumption that the interest rate on (default-free) Treasury bills 
remains unchanged. As is consistent with the effect of an increase in  7~ in 
equation (4) above, the upward-sloping curves representing lenders’ portfolio 
demands (alternatively, their supply of credit) in both markets shift inward.  l6 
As a result, the new equilibrium in each market exhibits a smaller quantity of 
credit extended and a higher interest rate (relative to default-free bills) than 
before the increase in perceived default risk. Hence the implied covariation 
between the observed spread to bills and the relevant credit quantity is nega- 
tive in each market. 
In principle, therefore, the loan-bill spread and the paper-bill spread might 
equally predict fluctuations in real output. No one has forcefully argued this 
16. Here and below, the curve representing banks’ demand for loans (supply of credit) is drawn 
with positive but finite slope. Making the curve vertical-i.e.,  assuming that banks in the aggre- 
gate have no flexibility to expand credit for a given quantity of  reserves supplied by the central 
bank-would  not materially change the analysis. 234  Benjamin M.  Friedman and Kenneth N. Kuttner 
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case empirically for the loan spread, however.’’ One reason is probably that 
bank  loans  have  many  implicit  (i.e., noninterest) price  elements,  so that 
changes in observed loan interest rates are not a good measure of changes in 
the cost of loans over short time horizons. Another likely reason is that bank 
lending often involves long-term customer relationships in which what may 
appear to be short-term departures from market-clearing price behavior may 
be perfectly rational. On both counts, it is not surprising that the paper-bill 
spread is superior as a short-run predictor of fluctuations in real output. (As 
table 5.1 above shows, the widening of the paper-bill spread before recessions 
is a matter of at most six months.) 
5.3.2  Changes in Monetary Policy 
A second explanation of the predictive power of the paper-bill spread, em- 
phasized by Bernanke (1990) and implicit in the work of Kashyap, Stein, and 
Wilcox (1993), points to monetary policy. Figure 5.6 illustrates the basic me- 
chanics at work here, again focusing on the respective markets for bank loans 
and commercial paper. A tightening of  monetary policy (smaller growth of 
bank reserves) causes banks’ demand for loans to shift inward. As in figure 
5.5 above, the result is a higher loan rate and a smaller loan quantity. Here, 
however, nonbank investors’ demand for commercial paper has not changed. 
As would-be borrowers who do not receive bank loans seek credit elsewhere, 
supply in the paper market shifts outward.I8 Hence the quantity of paper is- 
sued rises, as does the commercial paper interest rate. 
17.  In regressions analogous to those summarized in table 5.3 above, e.g., the loan-bill spread 
is significant at the .05 level in the second subsample but not in the first and not for the full sample. 
In the context represented by table 5.5 above, the loan-bill spread is not significant, even at the 
.10 level, in regressions also including the paper-bill sprzad. (Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993) 
have advanced an argument for what amounts to the loan-to-paper quanrity ratio.) 
18.  An alternative way to express the same relation is to note that demand in the paper market 
depends on the loan rate. 235  Why Does the Paper-Bill Spread Predict Real Economic Activity? 
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What is missing in the argument thus far is a reason why this increase in the 
paper rate would also represent an increase in the paper-bill spread. Tighter 
monetary policy presumably raises the bill rate too. If the predictive content 
of the paper-bill spread arises because changes in the spread reflect changes in 
monetary policy, which in turn affects output for any or all of  the standard 
reasons, tighter monetary policy must raise the paper rate not just absolutely 
but also relative to the bill rate. 
One answer to this question, following the analysis in section 5.2 above, is 
that both the tax component of the spread (for given state/municipal tax rates) 
and the default risk component (for given default probability and expected 
loss rate) depend directly on the level of the bill rate. To the extent that tight 
monetary policy raises the bill rate, therefore, it also widens the paper-bill 
spread. This line of argument is satisfactory as far as it goes, but ultimately 
insufficient. As the correlations and F-statistics presented in table 5.8 show, 
the predictive content of the paper-bill spread is not simply a matter of  the 
spread’s proportional covariation with the bill rate. 
An alternative (albeit not mutually exclusive) explanation offered by  Ber- 
nanke and by Kashyap et al. emphasizes, in part, heterogeneity among bor- 
rowers. If  the obligations of borrowers who shift from the bank loan market 
to the commercial paper market when monetary policy tightens are systemat- 
ically less attractive to commercial paper investors than the obligations of bor- 
rowers whose paper is already outstanding-either  because these new  bor- 
rowers are less creditworthy or because they deal in smaller volume so that 
their paper is less liquid-then  the resulting rise in default risk or loss of 
liquidity for the representative issuer’s  paper will  lead the market-average 
commercial paper rate to rise relative to the rate on Treasury bills (or any other 
instrument the risk and liquidity of which remain unchanged). 
Yet  a third potential explanation (again not mutually exclusive of the other 
two) reflects the behavior of investors allocating their portfolios among differ- 236  Benjamin M. Friedman and Kenneth N. Kuttner 
ent assets, as captured in equation (5). Even apart from changing objective 
characteristics like default risk or liquidity, the mere fact that investors regard 
commercial paper  and  Treasury  bills  as  imperfect  substitutes  implies  that 
some widening of the paper-bill spread is necessary, when tight monetary pol- 
icy forces borrowers  out of  the banks and into the open market, to induce 
investors  to  increase the  share of  their  assets  that  consists  of  commercial 
paper. 
5.3.3  Changes in Borrowers’ Cash Flows 
Finally, it is also possible that the behavior that shifts in such a way as to 
increase the paper-bill spread when real economic activity turns downward is 
not that of lenders but that of borrowers. As table 5.1  above shows, the spread 
is especially wide  not only just before recessions  but during recessions  as 
well.  Influences like tight monetary  policy, by  contrast,  might well be  ex- 
pected to change direction during the course of a recession, leading the spread 
to decrea~e.’~  (The analogous point does not apply to hypotheses based on 
time-varying default risk  since, as is clear from fig. 5.3 above, bankruptcy 
and default rates typically  remain  high for at least a year after a recession 
ends.) 
One major influence on borrowers’ behavior that could plausibly account 
for movements of the paper-bill spread in this context is the cyclical variation 
of  firms’ cash flows. As revenue growth ebbs and both inventory accumula- 
tion and operating costs continue to rise, in the final stages of a business ex- 
pansion, firms’ credit requirements  increase. Figure 5.7 shows such an in- 
crease as an outward shift in the supply of both bank loans and commercial 
paper. As in the case of the default risk hypothesis, shown in figure 5.5 above, 
the underlying mechanics are the same in both markets, at least in principle. 
The cash flows hypothesis, however, implies a positive correlation between 
changes in the paper rate and changes in the paper quantity. 
As in the case of the monetary policy hypothesis, here too some further 
argument is necessary to render the implied absolute increase in the paper rate 
an increase also relative  to the bill  rate.  Once again, either the borrower- 
heterogeneity  argument or the imperfect-substitutes  argument, or both, will 
suffice. 
5.4  Some Evidence on Competing Hypotheses 
The results presented in tables 5.7 and 5.8 above indicate that such factors 
as taxes, default risk, and liquidity, which plausibly explain much of the pos- 
itive average  paper-bill  spread, also play  some role in  accounting  for the 
movement of the spread over time (table 5.7) as well as the spread’s predictive 
power with respect to fluctuations of real output (table 5.8). In terms of the 
more structural analysis of section 5.3 above, an increase in perceived default 




Fig. 5.7  The cash flows hypothesis 
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risk represents a straightforward influence on the behavior of lenders. A wid- 
ening of the paper-bill spread due to the increasing importance of differential 
taxation, as  the general level of  interest rates rises,  likewise represents an 
influence on lenders’ behavior, but the reason why  interest rates rose in the 
first instance may reflect tighter monetary policy or still other influences on 
either borrowers’ or lenders’ behavior. The same is true of arguments based 
on liquidity. A shift in the composition of  the “market portfolio” toward a 
greater weight on commercial paper may well cause the spread between the 
respective returns to paper and other assets (including bills) to widen, but the 
question once again is why the outstanding volume in the paper market grew 
so rapidly in the first place. Answering questions like these on the basis of 
information about interest rates alone is clearly impossible. 
Figures 5.8 and 5.9 present the basic data corresponding to the quantities 
at issue in the discussion of  competing hypotheses in section 5.3. The top 
panel of  figure 5.8 shows that the four-quarter growth rate in the outstanding 
volume of  bank loans (commercial and industrial loans) typically peaks in 
advance of the onset of recessions-very  slightly in advance in most episodes, 
although much more so in  1957. The figure’s bottom panel (with greatly re- 
duced scale) plots analogous four-quarter growth rates for the total volume of 
non-bank-related domestic commercial paper outstanding as well as for the 
components of this total representing the obligations of nonfinancial corpora- 
tions and finance companies, respectively. In contrast to bank loan growth, 
the growth  of  nonjinancial  paper tends to  surge during recessions (1953, 
1957, 1960, 1973, 1981) more often than it tends to peak beforehand (1970 
and 1980). Growth of finance company paper, however-and  therefore of the 
total, too, since finance companies typically have nearly three times as much 
in outstandings as nonfinancial issuers-is  more like that of bank loans.*O 
20.  Data are from the flow-of-funds  accounts. 238  Benjamin M. Friedman and Kenneth N. Kuttner 
Fig. 5.8  Nominal four-quarter  bank loan and commercial paper growth, 
1953-90 
Figure 5.9 draws the same comparisons in a different way  by  plotting the 
respective changes in  outstanding bank loans, commercial paper issued by 
nonfinancial corporations, and finance company lending to nonfinancial cor- 
porations (all deflated by  the  gross national product deflator) during ten- 
quarter intervals surrounding business-cycle peaks. Each (deflated) series is 
expressed as the log deviation from the corresponding Hodrick-Prescott trend, 
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Table 5.9  Correlation Coefficients between the Paper-Bill Spread and Selected 
Variables 
Real  Nominal 
% change in commercial paper issued by  the 
% change in bank loans to the nonfinancial 
Nonfinancial sector financing deficit 
GNP, leading 2 quarters 
GNP, leading  1 quarter 
GNP, current 
GNP, lagging  I  quarter 
GNP, lagging 2 quarters 





-  .4?*** 
-  .51*** 
-  ,46*** 
~  ,29*** 




-  .23*** 
-  .23*** 
-  .IS* 
-  .03 
-  ,001 
Nore: Observations are quarterly; the sample is 1952:2-1990:3. Financial flow variables are from 
the flow-of-funds data base. Real variables are deflated by the implicit GNP deflator. The financ- 
ing deficit is the difference between capital expenditures and after-tax cash flow for the nonfarm, 
nonfinancial corporate sector. 
*  Significant at the 10% level. 
**  Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the  1% level. 
growth of bank loans and finance company paper to peak in advance of  the 
recession, and for the growth of nonfinancial-issuer  commercial paper to con- 
tinue-in  some episodes, to accelerate-on  into the recession, is apparent.21 
Given the tendency of the paper-bill spread to widen in advance of reces- 
sions and to remain wide during recessions, these observed quantity move- 
ments provide support for either the monetary policy hypothesis or the cash 
flows hypothesis as outlined in section 5.3. Declining growth of  bank loan 
volume, triggered by  tighter monetary policy, leads to increases both in the 
growth of commercial paper volume and in the paper-bill spread, as either of 
these two hypotheses (but not the default risk hypothesis) implies. 
The simple correlations shown in  the first two rows of  table 5.9 provide 
further  support,  especially  for  the  cash  flows  hypothesis.  The  paper-bill 
spread is positively correlated with the contemporaneous real growth rates of 
commercial paper volume and bank loan volume, but the correlation with 
paper volume growth is far greater. Under the cash flows hypothesis, both 
correlations would be positive, while, under the monetary policy hypothesis, 
the spread-tc+paper  growth correlation would be positive and the spread-t+ 
loan growth correlation would be negative. By contrast, under the default risk 
hypothesis, both correlations would be negative. 
Two  further elements of  this price-quantity interaction give still further 
21.  Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (in press) examined similar plots, but ones based on the dates 
identified by  Romer and Romer (1989) with changes in monetary policy rather than on actual 
business-cycle  peaks. Kashyap et al. also did not incorporate finance company paper in their 
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weight to the cash flows hypothesis in preference to the monetary policy hy- 
pothesis. First, as the third row of  table 5.9 shows, the paper-bill spread is 
also strongly correlated with contemporaneous growth of the cash deficit that 
nonfinancial corporations need to finance.22  Second, the role of  the finance 
companies presents a particular puzzle for the monetary policy hypothesis. 
Tighter monetary policy would, in the first instance, restrict the lending of 
banks but not finance companies. Would-be borrowers not accommodated by 
banks would then turn to finance companies, with the result that these institu- 
tions’ lending (and hence their borrowing to fund that lending) would rise 
along with that of  nonfinancial issuers of  commercial paper. As figures 5.8 
and 5.9 show, however, growth of finance paper fluctuates more in step with 
growth of bank loans than with growth of paper issued by nonfinancial cor- 
porations. 
Especially when they relate prices and quantities, simple correlations can 
often be misleading. Table 5.10 therefore presents the results of  estimating 
several variations of  a regression relating the paper-bill spread to contempo- 
raneous and lagged growth in the total volume of non-bank-related domestic 
commercial paper outstanding (including issues of  both  nonfinancial firms 
and finance companies) and to a direct measure of perceived default risk. 
The ordinary least squares regression reported in row  1 of the table shows 
that the spread is related positively both to lagged paper volume growth (ex- 
pressed  relative to the total amount of  paper and bills outstanding) and to 
perceived default risk as measured by the P2-P1 differential and negatively to 
the relative quantity of Treasury bills outstanding. It also shows that the time 
trend is not only negative (as usual) but statistically significant along with the 
other three variables. The relation of  the paper-bill spread to paper volume 
growth and the bill quantity provides evidence supporting the assumption that 
investors regard commercial paper and Treasury bills as imperfect portfolio 
substitutes, which is an important element in either the monetary policy hy- 
pothesis or the cash flows hypothesis. The relation of the spread to the P2-P1 
differential, even in the presence of growth in paper volume, provides evi- 
dence in favor of  the default risk hypothesis. The significance here of  the 
negative time trend-indicating  a declining spread on average over time, as 
the commercial paper market has become more fully developed-presumably 
reflects the advantage of using a relation that makes at least some allowance 
for supply effects on the relative yields of commercial paper and Treasury bills 
(in contrast to, e.g., the insignificant time trends shown in table 5.7 above). 
Allowing for the simultaneity of  supply and demand renders this evidence 
in favor of imperfect substitutability and the role of perceived default risk even 
more persuasive. Row 2 of  table 5.10 reports two-stage least squares esti- 
mates of the same regression, using as instruments the log change in the real 
22.  The deficit is the difference between internally generated funds (gross of depreciation) and 
investment outlays. Data are from the flow-of-funds accounts. Table 5.10  Structural Equations for the Paper-Bill Spread 
Dependent  CPFLOW  TBSHARE  CFQ  BONDQ  rB6 
Variable  Method  Sample  (t)  (t - I)  (t)  (I)  (I)  Constant  Trend  PENN  SE  D-W 
1  rp6 -  r86  OLS  74:2-90:4  10.99 
(4.90) 
2  rp6 -  r86 2SLS  74:2-90:4  25.31 
( 10.49) 
3  r,, -  rR3  2SLS  74:2-90:4  25.26 
(9.67) 
4  r,,  2SLS  74:2-90:4  18.36 
(8.82) 
5  rp6 -  r86  OLS  67:3-90:4  11.83 
(3.04) 
6  r,, -  rRn  2SLS  67:3-90:4  40.11 
(  17.74) 












-  6.36 
-6.58 
-6.32 















-  ,027 
(.010) 
-  ,024 
(.012) 
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(.007) 
-  ,026 
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-  ,028 
.36  .87 
.40  1.20 
.46  1.30 
.37  1.09 
.45  .41  .87 
1.57  .55  1.35 
.92  .44  1.10 
(. 19) 
(  .64) 
(.46) 
Note; Variable definitions: rp6 = 6-month commercial paper rate (a);  r,,  = 3-month commercial paper rate (%); rB6 = 6-month 
Treasury bill rate (%); rs3 = 3-month Treasury bill rate (%); BONDQ = Baa-Aaa corporate bond quality differential (%);  CPQ 
= P2-PI paper quality differential (%); CPFLOW  = change in total commercial paper  + total stock of  commercial paper and 
Treasury bills; TBSHARE = Treasury bill outstandings + total stock of commercial paper and Treasury bills; PENN = dummy 
variable equal to 1 in  1970:3, the date of the Penn Central default. Estimates are based on quarterly observations, for the sample 
indicated. Numbers in  parentheses are robust standard errors, corrected for 4th-order moving-average serial correlation.  In the 
2SLS regressions, CPFLOW is replaced by the instrument formed by its projection onto a constant, the lagged dependent variable, 
and the current value and one lag of  the following: real monetary base growth, real nonborrowed reserve growth, and the difference 
between nonfinancial firms' investment expenditures and their after-tax cash flow. 243  Why Does the Paper-Bill Spread Predict Real Economic Activity? 
monetary base, current and lagged once; the log change in real nonborrowed 
reserves (augmented to include “extended credit”), current and lagged once; 
and the financing deficit of nonfinancial corporations (as a share of the amount 
of paper and bills outstanding), current and lagged once-all  variables that 
are  plausibly  related  to  either  monetary  policy  or  borrowers’  financing 
needs.23  Two-stage least squares estimation based on these variables as instru- 
ments for the change in the volume of commercial paper outstanding increases 
the coefficients on paper volume growth and on the pure default risk vari- 
able.24  The regression reported in row  3 shows that comparable results also 
follow from measuring the respective interest rates on commercial paper and 
Treasury bills at three- rather than six-months’ maturity.25 
The regression reported in row 4 of table 5.10, again using six-month rates, 
further confirms these findings and indicates once more the importance of 
simultaneity in this context.  If  the correct dependent variable for studying 
investors’ willingness to buy  commercial paper versus Treasury bills is the 
paper-bill spread, then adding the bill rate to both sides of  the equation (so 
that the dependent variable is simply the paper rate) should result in a coeffi- 
cient of unity on the bill rate as an independent variable and unchanged coef- 
ficients elsewhere. Comparison of rows 4 and 2 shows that the bill rate does 
indeed have a coefficient of  approximately unity and that, in other respects, 
the new regression corresponds quite closely to its earlier equivalent.26  Once 
again, the conclusions to be drawn are that investors regard commercial paper 
and Treasury bills as imperfect substitutes in a way that matters for the paper- 
bill spread, that the spread is related to fluctuations in paper volume growth 
that correspond to variables plausibly reflecting changes in  either monetary 
policy or business financing needs, and that there is a further, independent 
role for changes in perceived default risk. 
The results shown in rows 5-7  of table 5.10 indicate that using the Baa-Aaa 
bond rate differential in place of the P2-PI paper rate differential (which, fol- 
lowing the discussion above, permits lengthening the sample) preserves the 
overall flavor of the evidence. The coefficient on the quality variable is much 
smaller (albeit still statistically significant), as is consistent with the bond dif- 
ferential’s measuring much less accurately the default probabilities that are 
relevant to commercial paper investors, but in other respects the results for the 
longer sample are highly similar to those shown above. 
23.  The P2-Pl spread and the lagged bill share are also included as instruments because they 
are treated as exogenous in the regression. 
24. These results are  robust to such changes in the instrument list as dropping the financing 
deficit or including instruments constructed from interest rates. 
25. The increase in the estimated coefficient on the quality differential in this regression is 
reassuring, in that the P2-P1 differential is actually measured for one-month maturities. 
26. Because the commercial paper rate and the Treasury bill rate are  each I(1), the limiting 
distribution of the coefficient on the bill rate in row 4 is nonnormal, so its r-statistic overstates the 
precision of the parameter estimate. The coefficients on the remaining stationary regressors will 
have normal limiting distributions,  however. 244  Benjamin M. Friedman and Kenneth N. Kuttner 
Table 5.11  F-Statistics for Financial Variables in Augmented Monthly Real 
Output Equations 
1960:  1-1990:12  1974:7-1990: 12 
Aln(M  1)  .56  .65 
Ar.8  .87  1.84* 
P2-PI paper quality differential  2.25** 
‘P  -  ‘B  5.26***  4.08*** 
Baa-Aaa bond quality differential  3.94*  ** 
Nore: The estimated  six-variable system includes the first-differences of  the logs of  industrial 
production,  the producer price index, and M1; the first-difference of  the 6-month Treasury bill 
rate; the quality differential in levels; and the paper-bill spread in levels. Six lags are included for 
each regressor. 
*  Significant at the 10% level. 
**  Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
Finally, the  question remains whether the  information about real  output 
contained in the paper-bill spread cannot be just as easily (or almost as easily) 
represented with more standard variables, including variables corresponding 
conceptually to the several hypotheses developed in section 5.3. On the evi- 
dence, the answer is no. The results summarized in table 5.  l l and in figures 
5.10 and 5.11 show that,  even after allowing for such variables as money 
growth and perceived default risk and the general level of interest rates, there 
is still a further element of the paper-bill spread that contains predictive con- 
tent with respect to fluctuations in real output that is both statistically signifi- 
cant and economically important. 
The first column of table 5.11 shows F-statistics for the real output equation 
of a six-variable vector autoregression including the respective log changes in 
industrial production, the producer price index, and M1; the change in the bill 
rate; the Baa-Aaa differential; and the paper-bill spread. The estimation uses 
monthly data spanning 196O:l-1990: 12, with a lag length of  six. Even in the 
presence of these five other variables, representing so many of the hypotheses 
considered in this paper, the distributed lag on the paper-bill rate is still signif- 
icant at the  .01 level. The table’s second column shows F-statistics for an 
analogous system with the P2-PI differential in place of the Baa-Aaa differ- 
ential, and sample 1974:7-1990: 12. Here the paper-bill spread is again signif- 
icant at the .01 level. 
Moreover, this “residual” explanatory power of the paper-bill spread is not 
just  statistically significant but  quantitatively important.  Figures 5.10 and 
5.11 show the respective sets of  impulse response functions indicating the 
effects on real output (estimated responses, bounded by 95 percent confidence 
intervals) due to the financial variables in these two systems, orthogonalized 
in  the order that the variables are listed above-that  is, with the paper-bill 
spread placed last. In the system estimated for the longer sample, the “resid- -.0012J  I  I  ,  I  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  , 
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Fig. 5.11  Impulse response functions for real output (using the P2-PI paper quality differential) 247  Why Does the Paper-Bill Spread Predict Real Economic Activity? 
ual” effect of the spread on real output is immediate, large, and prolonged. In 
the  system estimated for the shorter sample, the effect is less regular but 
clearly visible nonetheless and  statistically significant at  the  familiar six- 
month horizon by which a widening of  the spread usually anticipates reces- 
sions. 
Even if it were true, therefore, that changes in monetary policy or changes 
in perceived default risk in principle account fully for the fluctuation of  the 
paper-bill spread and for its relation to fluctuations in real output, the spread 
would remain a potentially useful predictor because of its ability to embody 
relevant aspects of those influences that are not captured by standard variables 
like money growth and observed debt quality differentials. 
5.5  Summary of Conclusions 
The empirical evidence assembled in this paper supports several specific 
conclusions about the relation between the paper-bill  spread and real  eco- 
nomic activity in the United States. To  begin, regression-based evidence for 
the last three decades of U.S. experience-including  two subperiods deline- 
ated by key structural changes in financial institutions-consistently  points to 
a statistically significant relation between movements of the paper-bill spread 
and subsequent fluctuations in real output, even in the presence of other finan- 
cial  variables that  previous  researchers have  often  advanced  as  potential 
business-cycle predictors. This evidence includes not only significant explan- 
atory power of  the spread in equations for real output movements but also 
significant ability of the spread to account for the variance of  real output at 
forecast horizons relevant in a business-cycle context. 
Next,  readily  identifiable  features  of  commercial  paper  and  Treasury 
bills-including  the favorable tax treatment of bills at the state and municipal 
level, the default risk on paper, and the superior liquidity of bills-distinguish 
these two instruments in such a way that rational investors would not plausi- 
bly treat them as perfect substitutes. These factors can reasonably account for 
the average spread observed over time between the two instruments’ respec- 
tive interest rates. The central focus of this paper, however, is not the mean 
paper-bill spread but the spread’s variation over time and, in particular, the 
predictive power of that variation with respect to real output. In this context, 
an important finding of this paper is that a decomposition of  the spread into 
components reflecting the interest rate level, a time-varying measure of de- 
fault risk, and a residual delivers three components, each of  which bears a 
significant relation to subsequent movements in real output. 
Finally, evidence based on a more structural approach exploiting the pre- 
sumed imperfect portfolio substitutability of commercial paper and Treasury 
bills provides support for each of three hypotheses about why movements of 
the spread anticipate movements in real output. First, changing perceptions of 
default risk exert a clearly recognizable influence on the spread, an influence 
that is all the more discernible after allowance for supply effects associated 248  Benjamin M. Friedman and Kenneth N. Kuttner 
with imperfect  substitutability. In this respect, the spread serves as a useful 
“indicator” variable,  compactly summarizing information  available to inves- 
tors from a variety of disparate sources, but the underlying relations play no 
directly causal role in affecting  economic activity.  Second, given imperfect 
substitutability, a widening paper-bill spread is also a symptom of the contrac- 
tion in bank lending due to tighter monetary policy. In this respect, the spread 
does in part reflect a causal influence on economic activity. Third, there is also 
some evidence of  a further role for independent changes in the behavior of 
borrowers in the commercial paper market due to their changing cash require- 
ments over the course of the business cycle, but for the most part this third 
channel remains a potential object of further research. 
These findings  are subject to numerous caveats, of  course, and in most 
cases there is no need to reiterate  them here. The one reservation that does 
perhaps deserve explicit attention in conclusion is that the ability to sort out 
these three competing hypotheses (or, for that matter, still others) with time- 
series data relies  crucially on the presence  of  multiple  independent  shocks 
generating movements in economic activity. For example, if changes in mon- 
etary policy were the only factor determining whether the economy were to 
be in a boom or a recession, then the effect associated above with changing 
perceptions  of  default probabilities  and the effect associated  with changing 
business cash flows would both be merely subsidiary reflections of  monetary 
policy.  In this  respect,  investigation  of  the  relation  between  the paper-bill 
spread and real economic activity  is little different from much  of empirical 
macroeconomics.  Given the rich data potentially available on commercial pa- 
per transactions by individual borrowers and lenders, however, in this case a 
useful supplement to research  based on the aggregate time series would be 
parallel exploitation of micro-level data. 
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Comment  Ben S. Bernanke 
The classic challenge to economic researchers is to make a statement about 
the economy that is both true and surprising. The observation that the spread 
between the commercial paper and the Treasury-bill interest rates has remark- 
able predictive power for the economy, documented in earlier work by Fried- 
man and Kuttner (1990) and by Stock and Watson (1989), appears to satisfy 
both conditions. In this interesting and nicely executed contribution, Fried- 
man and Kuttner build on their previous analysis of  the paper-bill spread to 
try to explain why the spread appears to predict so well. Understanding why 
the spread predicts is important, both for the light it sheds on the workings of 
the economy and for helping us assess whether this spread will continue to be 
informative in the future. 
In tackling the question of  why the paper-bill  spread predicts  economic 
Ben S. Bernanke is professor of economics at Princeton University and a research associate of 
the National Bureau of Economic Research. 250  Benjamin M. Friedman and Kenneth N. Kuttner 
activity, Friedman and Kuttner follow the most obvious leads (differential tax- 
ation of  interest on the two instruments,  default risk,  and monetary  policy 
effects) and add a new explanation (changing cash requirements of borrowers 
over the cycle). I generally agree with their approach and their list of suspects; 
my comments consist primarily of reactions to some details of the paper. 
Friedman and Kuttner begin in section 5.1 by documenting the strong pre- 
dictive power of  the paper-bill  spread.  While this is by  now fairly familiar 
ground, several points are worth highlighting. 
First, as a general rule, the most striking results for the paper-bill  spread 
are found when predictive power is assessed by a Granger-causality metric. 
Indeed, while Friedman and Kuttner in most cases trace the paper-bill spread 
against only  one or two other financial  variables  at a time,  Bernanke  and 
Blinder (1992) show that the spread retains its strong Granger-causality prop- 
erties even in kitchen-sink  VARs with a number of  other financial variables 
included simultaneously. For example, in a forecasting equation for industrial 
production that also included six monthly lags each of industrial production, 
the CPI, M1, M2, the term structure premium, and the Federal funds rate, 
Bernanke and Blinder found that the marginal probability that the paper-bill 
spread can be excluded from the equation was .0049, while none of  the other 
monetary or financial variables was significant even at the .20 level. Similarly, 
Bemanke (1990) showed that the paper-bill spread is an effective predictor in 
the  Granger sense even  when  the official index of  leading indicators is in- 
cluded in the prediction equation. 
On the other hand, when the metric of forecasting power is the percentage 
of  forecast  variance explained  at various  horizons,  the  performance  of  the 
paper-bill  spread  is  good but  somewhat  less  dominant  (see  Friedman  and 
Kuttner’s tables 5.5 and 5.6).  Bernanke and Blinder (1992) found that, on the 
variance decomposition metric, the Federal funds rate (or the spread between 
the  funds rate  and  the  Treasury-bond  rate)  does  somewhat  better than  the 
paper-bill  spread in predicting a variety  of  macro variables  at monthly  fre- 
quencies (Friedman and Kuttner still give the edge to the paper-bill spread). 
Bernanke and Blinder argue that the contrast between the Granger-causality 
and the variance decomposition findings is consistent with the joint hypothesis 
that (1) monetary policy is an important source of fluctuations, (2)  the funds 
rate is the best financial indicator of the stance of monetary policy, but (3) the 
paper-bill  spread is the best indicator of overall conditions in credit markets, 
as determined by both monetary policy and other factors. 
Second, while it may be true that the paper-bill spread is the overall winner 
in the forecasting derby (a result also found for a long list of macro variables 
by Bernanke [  1990]), there really is quite a bit of independent information in 
some other interest rate indicators as well, including the aforementioned funds 
rate and the funds rate-bond  spread, the spread between one-year and ten- 
year government bonds, the CD-bill spread, quality spreads (such as the Baa- 
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to Friedman and Kuttner’s approach of focusing on the single best indicator 
(the paper-bill spread) would have been to undertake a more multivariate anal- 
ysis. For example, one might apply factor-analysis techniques to try to extract 
the best-predicting factors from a list of  interest rate indicators and then at- 
tempt to interpret these factors economically (e.g., as indicators of monetary 
policy, default risk, etc.). This is not an easy exercise, but it seems to me to 
be a useful direction for future research. 
A final point on section 5.1 is that Friedman and Kuttner’s results do not 
directly address the question of whether the predictive power of the paper-bill 
spread has survived into the 1980s. Bernanke (1990) suggested that the fore- 
casting power of the spread significantly weakened in the last decade, and, as 
Friedman and Kuttner note, the spread did not do well in forecasting the 1990 
recession. True, it is not  easy to assess the extent to which the paper-bill 
spread’s predictive power has recently declined, as we have only eight or nine 
years of data since the Volcker experiment ended in 1982. However, the issue 
is an important one, not only for forecasting reasons, but also for trying to 
understand the economic reasons for the spread’s predictive power. For ex- 
ample, if the spread predicts the course of the real economy because it mea- 
sures default risk,  its forecasting power should not have deteriorated in the 
last decade; but, if the relative illiquidity of the commercial paper market is a 
key factor, then the spread’s forecasting power might have declined over time 
as that market has gotten deeper. 
Section 5.2 of the paper discusses factors that account for the average size 
of  the paper-bill spread, particularly differences in taxability and differences 
in default risk of the two types of assets. I found the authors’ discussion of the 
role of default risk to be very helpful, but I still disagree somewhat with their 
implied conclusion that default risk is quantitatively an equal partner in ex- 
plaining the level and movements of the spread. Even admitting factors such 
as imperfect diversification and differences between objective and subjective 
assessments of default risk, it is hard to see how default risk could account for 
more than ten to twenty basis points of the level of the spread given actual loss 
experience in the postwar period. Perhaps more important, changes in default 
risk over time seem unlikely to account for a major part of  the rather large 
observed changes in the spread. On the other hand, changes in the spread due 
to changes in default risk could be informative about the economy even if they 
are quantitatively small. 
The principal empirical exercise of section 5.2 is an attempt to break down 
movements in the spread to parts attributed to (1) movements in the level of 
interest rates, (2) changes in default risk (as measured by the commercial pa- 
per and corporate-bond quality spreads), and (3) the residual. I am not quite 
clear as to the motivation for this decomposition since (as the authors discuss 
later in the paper) the economic interpretation of this decomposition is not 
unambiguous. Changes in the level of interest rates in particular could be the 
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the “quality spread” in the commercial paper market could conceivably reflect 
changing liquidity differentials between the thick P1 market and the thin P2 
market as well as default risk.  For this reason, I prefer the more explicitly 
structural analysis that is performed later in the paper. 
Section 5.3 discusses major candidate explanations for the predictive power 
of  the spread using a simple but instructive supply-demand framework, and 
section 5.4 presents some evidence on these competing hypotheses. An im- 
portant contribution of section 5.4 is the use of data on both interest rates and 
asset quantities to help discriminate between the various hypotheses. The evi- 
dence seems very clear that the assumption of imperfect substitutability be- 
tween paper and other assets is essential  for explaining  why  the paper-bill 
spread is predictive; imperfect substitutability is a key element in stories that 
link the behavior of the spread to monetary policy actions. There also seems 
to be some support for Friedman and Kuttner’s hypothesis that changing bor- 
rower  needs  for liquidity  help drive the  spread.  A perhaps naive question 
about this hypothesis is why shortages of borrower liquidity (as signaled by 
an increase in the spread) necessarily foretell recessions. It seems that an ex- 
panded demand for external finance by  borrowers might as easily signal an 
anticipated boom as the end of an expansion. 
The results of this section cast some light on the work by Kashyap, Stein, 
and Wilcox (in press), who interpreted the tendency of commercial paper out- 
standing to expand during periods of loan contraction as evidence for the idea 
that monetary policy works by  affecting bank  loan supply. The argument of 
Kashyap et al. was that the negative correlation of loan growth and commer- 
cial paper growth implies that borrowers are being forced to substitute away 
from  loans  when  monetary  stringency  reduces  loan  supply;  if  bank  loan 
growth were driven instead by changes in credit demand, then the growth rates 
of loans and commercial paper would be positively correlated. Friedman and 
Kuttner note that finance company lending to business, which may be an even 
closer substitute for bank  loans than commercial  paper, does not generally 
expand during periods of loan contraction-which,  from the point of view of 
the thesis of Kashyap et al., is a puzzle. In this respect, the recent behavior of 
these  credit  quantities  is  interesting:  as Bernanke  and  Lown  (1991) have 
noted, during the initial phases of the current “credit crunch,” for example, 
during the year before the beginning of the current (1990) recession, slow- 
downs in bank lending were accompanied by expansions in both commercial 
paper  and finance company lending,  which is consistent  with the idea that 
there was a constraint on loan supply during that period. During the recession 
itself  (199O:II-199 1  :I),  however,  commercial  paper  and  finance  company 
lending both weakened along with bank lending. The failure of commercial 
paper issuance to expand in particular suggests either that the 1990 recession 
is the first not to have been  associated  with a contraction  in  the supply of 
alternatives  to commercial  paper or,  alternatively, that  some force  has  re- 253  Why Does the Paper-Bill Spread Predict Real Economic Activity? 
stricted the supply of funds to the commercial paper market as well as the 
supply of bank and finance company loans. 
In the end, Friedman and Kuttner reject monocausal explanations and con- 
clude that several factors contribute to the predictive power of the paper-bill 
spread. However, even when one attempts to control for these various factors, 
it seems impossible to wipe out the residual predictive power of the paper-bill 
spread. I think that, despite the excellent start made by this paper, there may 
still be more to learn about why the paper-bill spread contains so much infor- 
mation about the future. 
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